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Abstract
Cryptographic keys are used to encipher data. Agencies generating
these key numbers want to combine a minimal key length for computa-
tional and data storage reasons with a guaranteed service of unique key
numbers. This paper describes the modeling of the length of the key
number to reach an imposed collision improbability.
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1 Introduction
Asymmetrical cryptography [4] [5] is recognized to support the current chal-
lenges of digital privacy and authenticity [1] over public networks like the Inter-
net. The technology assures the encryption and decryption of data based on a
complementary pair of digital keys. Data which was encrypted with one of the
keys of the key pair can only be decrypted with the other complementary key.
If one of the keys is kept secret (private key) and the other key is made public
(public key) to prove the identity of the owner of the private key, privacy and
authenticity of data can be assured without the need to transfer private keys
over an insecure public network. However in any circumstance the uniqueness
of the created key pairs should be assured, avoiding the possibility that two or
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more identities may be associated to the same key pair and consequently to the
same secured data. The uniqueness depends on the quality of the random key
generators and the size of the population of key pairs which is a function of the
key length (number of bits used for a key). Within a specific context (e.g. the
generation of key pairs for a national electronic identity card) the uniqueness
of a key pair can be assured by applying appropriate control mechanisms like
verifying if a key has not already been issued in the past (key clash detection).
However key uniqueness should also be assured between specific contexts. In
practice no control mechanisms exist between such different contexts (e.g. na-
tions mutually verifying the uniqueness of their generated key pairs) and the
only way to assure uniqueness is to make it very unlikely that a same key would
be generated multiple times. As the number of required key pairs could be con-
siderable (every citizen requiring a set of unique key pairs which are renewed
after a certain period of time) the probability of a possible key clash should be
known for a certain choice of cryptographic key length. This paper describes
a model for estimating the required key length, given a certain probability of
encountering a key clash.
2 Key length selection
A lot of research has been done on key size selection as a function of hash
functions [6]. These are functions that compress input of arbitrary length to a
shorter fixed sized output. Sarkar [3] presented a new trade-off between key size
and collision probability for universal hash functions. When practical advice
needs to be given about the minimum required key size, this is often based on
the risk of cracking the encrypted data, extrapolated to the number of years
that you need to keep the encrypted data confidential. Lenstra & Verheul [2]
use Moore’s Law to estimate the required key length to protect data against
hostile attacks.
So far, less attention has been spent on the case of collision probability in the
random choice of cryptographic keys without duplication check. Therefore, in
section 3 we want to model the risk of collision without key clash detection.
Section 4 describes the impact on the collision probability when two contexts
meet.
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3 Modeling the requested key length
When x keys have to be selected out of 2A (all possible binary keys of length
A) by the principle of drawing with replacement, the probability of generating
a duplicate key by random generation of keys is called p0 with
p0 = 1− P (all keys are different)
= 1−
∏x−1
i=1
(2A − i)
(2A)x−1
. (1)
Given a fixed number x of keys to be selected, the probability (1) can be
considered as a function of the length of the key A. The shape of the curve
depicting p0 as a function of A for x = 2 × 10
α (α = 2, 3, 4) can be seen in
Figure 1 and can be modeled by
f(A, α) =
1
2
erf(a+ b α−
A
c
) +
1
2
, (2)
with the Gauss error function
erf(x) =
2
pi
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt. (3)
A curve fitting procedure gives the best fitting values for a, b and c, resulting
in the model
f0(A, α) =
1
2
erf(0.6 + 2.7α−
A
2.5
) +
1
2
. (4)
This model for the probability of generating a duplicate key enables us to esti-
mate the requested key length, imposing a collision probability.
4 Probability of key collisions between different
contexts
Although key collisions can be avoided within one context by preserving the
uniqueness of the keys, difficulties can arise when different contexts meet. Two
nations for example can use keys of equal lengths A for a national electronic
identity card. What is the risk that citizens of different nations use equal private
keys for encryption and decryption of confidential data, so privacy can no longer
be guaranteed? If x1 keys are well selected in context 1, so no collisions between
them are possible and similarly x2 keys are selected in context 2, the chance of
intercontextual collisions is
pic = 1−
(
2A − x1
2A
)x2
, (5)
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Figure 1: The probability p0 as a function of the length of a key for x = 2 × 10
α
(α = 2 (solid line), α = 3 (dashed line), α = 4 (dashdot line)).
Table 1: Collision risk f0 of individual systems and the intercontextual collision
risk pic for a set of key lengths A.
A f0(A, 2.8) f0(A, 3.0) pic
30 2.8 10−8 1.5 10−6 2.3 10−3
35 7.3 10−17 3.3 10−14 7.3 10−5
40 7.2 10−29 2.8 10−25 2.2 10−6
as for all x2 keys (2
A
− x1) good choices can be made out of the possible 2
A.
This is illustrated in Figure 2 which shows that in case of sufficient individual
key lengths, a loss of reliability occurs when different contexts meet. The inter-
contextual collision probability pic for x1 = 2 × 10
2.8 and x2 = 2 × 10
3 exceeds
the individual collision probabilities f0. Table 1 gives for this example some
detailed values by estimating the risk of collisions f0 of both systems and adds
the probability pic, estimating the collision risk when those systems meet.
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Figure 2: The probability pic as a function of the length A of a key for x1 =
2 × 102.8 and x2 = 2 × 10
3 (solid line) compared to f0(A, 2.8) (dashdot line)
and f0(A, 3) (dash line)).
5 Conclusions
For random key generation with guarantee of uniqueness, modeling the key
length imposes a minimal key length as a function of the required collision
probability. Special attention is required when different contexts can meet.
Although individual sets of keys can be practically collision free, privacy can no
longer be guaranteed when interaction is possible. By modeling this risk, the
required enlargement of the key length to approach collision free systems, can
be derived.
References
[1] Banaszak, B. and Rotziewicz K. (2004), Trust and security. Digital citizen
cards in Poland, Proceedings of third international conference on electronic
government, Zaragoza (Spain), Springer, ed. R. Traunmuller, pp. 342–347.
[2] Lenstra, A. K. and Verheul, E. R. (2001) Selecting Cryptographic Key
Sizes, Journal of Cryptology, Vol.14(4), pp.255–293.
5
[3] Sarkar, P. (2011) A trade-off between collision probability and key size in
universal hashing using polynomials, Proceedings of Des. Codes Cryptog-
raphy, pp.271–278.
[4] Stamp, M. (2011) Information Security: principles and practice, John Wi-
ley & sons.
[5] Trcek, D. (2006) Managing information systems security and privacy,
Springer.
[6] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic hash function
6
